This paper studies the evolution of the competitive structure of the two-wheeler industry in India. The evolution of the industry's competitive structure is traced using Kendall's Index of Rank Concordance and the Evans-Karras test of convergence. The industry seems to be characterized by oligopoly with the onset of economic reforms not making much difference to industrial structure. Convergence of sales and capacity at the level of the industry is conditional while it is absolute at the level of the segment. 
I. Introduction
Contemporary research has examined market structure in order to explain consumer brand preferences based on attributes of these brands. While Elrod (1988) , Chintagunta (1994) and Elrod and Keane (1995) use static market structure models, Erdem (1996) uses a dynamic model. In another study, Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) have examined the principal structural features of the computer industry in the U.S. at the industry-wide and segmentlevels. They explain the persistence of dominant computer firms, their decline in the 1990s and the changes in the competitive entry in this industry. They discover that technological competition in the industry has increased through a) the formation of young platforms serving newly founded segments that challenged established platforms through the process of indirect entry and b) divided technical leadership resulting from the vertical disintegration of platforms. Other studies that have examined industrial structure include Baldwin and Gorecki (1994) , Adelman (1951) , Golan et. al. (1996) and Amato (1995) .
It is noteworthy that all such studies of evolution of industries have largely been confined to the US and the Canadian experience. More specifically there does not exist any work along these lines for the Indian industrial sector. The Indian industrial sector has undergone profound regulatory changes in recent times as a consequence of the economic reforms program put together in between 1988 and 1991. Consequent to these reforms some of the industries that have been influenced the most have been the consumer durables industry (such as two-wheelers, washing machines, televisions etc.), the automobile industry and certain financial services. Typically an economy undergoing industrial reforms resorts to regulatory changes and redefines the role of the public sector in order to create a climate of growth and foster private competition. Therefore it is pertinent to examine the structure and evolution of industries (such as consumer durables) in economies where reforms have taken place, for such industries show a propensity to evolve into oligopolies in the long run. It would be important in this context, to analyze the impact that economic reforms have had on industrial structure and to understand the implications thereof for the design of an appropriate regulatory mechanism in response.
In an evolving industry especially in emerging economies like India, it is extremely important to formulate optimal policies on competition in order to promote both competition as well as growth. In the U.S., for example, these objectives form the basis for regulatory modified the Sherman Act with regard to firms' policies on using distribution channels and giving specific dealer rebates etc. One should note that for the Indian consumer durables industry the last point is crucial, since most manufacturers operate through dealers and, the dealer margins have been on the rise in order to provide protection for respective marketshares 1 . This fact could actually constitute "unfair" trade practices on the part of the firms.
The Indian two-wheeler industry resembles a cartel in the manner in which non-price factors are used to make the output of a given firm more valuable than that of a rival. The resulting higher price is due to this added cost. If the consumers valued the additional services generated by this competition above its cost, presumably these services would have been produced in a competitive market as well. Posner (1976) argues that if antitrust laws are not formulated appropriately, competing sellers might be able to engage in "conscious parallelism" or tacit collusion and that the Sherman Act has proved ineffectual in dealing with the latter form of collusion. Bork (1978) The competitive policy so developed must be able to distinguish between real competition and purely theoretical competition. Competitive policy is not a road to Utopia or a complete basis for public policy (Areeda and Kaplow (1988) ). Yet as Stigler (1966) points out, an optimal policy on competition often prevents the defects of social organization from being made worse by preventing deliberate adoption of restrictive practices by firms.
In this paper we assess the degree of imperfection in the two-wheeler industry in particular. The reason is that this industry underwent a sea change during 1985-1991 due to economic reforms introduced in this period. These reforms were aimed at encouraging competition. During this period, the two-wheeler industry saw the largest proliferation of brands in the consumer durables industry but whether this indeed led to enhanced competition is an empirical question, not yet examined. This paper purports to address this question.
Market imperfections are typically examined by calculating the Herfindahl index and the four-firm concentration ratios at the industry-wide and segment levels. Industrial economists have been debating the usefulness of these indices in assessing market concentration. While Posner (1976) argues that concentration ratios are but one of the indicators of collusive tendencies and that it is necessary to include fringe firms in the analysis, Adelman (1951) , Amato (1995) , Golan, Judge, and Perloff (1996) , and, Baldwin and Gorecki (1994) have shown that the Herfindahl index forms a much sounder indicator of the structure and performance of a given industry than four-firm concentration ratios.
The Herfindahl index is used, to a considerable extent, by the structuralist school, which postulates that competition, is a state of affairs (Reid, (1987) ). While four firm concentration ratios and Herfindahl indices have their virtues as indicators of market concentration at a point in time, it is also important to understand the evolution of market power over time. Such an inquiry would also be in consonance with the Austrian school, which believes that competition should be examined as a process. In this spirit Baldwin and Gorecki (1994) track the mobility of firms (which captures shifts in market structure) by using a variant of the instability index of Hymer and Pashigian (1962) . We have used the Kendall's rank concordance test to put into perspective the mobility of the firms. This is a more robust measure of tracking mobility of firms over time, since it also incorporates certain aspects of Lorenz type measurements to indicate relative positions of firms over time. If this index is used along with the concentration ratios, one can identify the contributors towards concentration over time in a clearer manner. This test also enables us to examine whether the dominance of any given firm persists over time and if this dominance is increasing/decreasing. However, a study of dominance in terms of persistence of ranks needs to be supplemented with one on dominance in terms of levels. If the ranks of firms in terms of shares in sales do not alter much over time, one still needs to assess whether differences between the sales shares of these firms are narrowing over time. The Evans and Karras (1996) test of convergence is ideally suited for this purpose. This test enables us to examine whether firms within the industry as a whole, tend to grow at similar rates in the long run and captures the dynamics associated with the long-term growth of volumes and market-shares at the segment and industry-wide levels. This, then, sheds light on the inter-firm dependencies at these two levels, which in turn has implications for the competitive strategies of firms. We also conduct this test for production capacities of firms to test whether capacity expansion was the result of competition within the industry. Based on the results of this paper we can make certain general conclusions about the consumer durables industries. For example, we establish that a) consumer durables industries will evolve as oligopolies at the industry-wide level and at the level of the segments, b) that the convergence of growth rates of sales volume and market-share is likely to be conditional 2 at the level of the industry and absolute 3 at the segment level.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the evolution of the two-wheeler industry, while section III details the model and data used. Results are discussed in section IV and section V concludes.
II. Evolution of the Indian two-wheeler industry
The 1980, 1985, 1992) . This resolution divided the entire industrial sector into three groups, of which one contained industries whose development was the exclusive responsibility of the State, another included those industries in which both the State and the private sector could participate and the last set of industries that could be developed exclusively under private initiative within the guidelines and objectives laid out by the Five Year Plans (CMIE, 1990) .
Private investment was channelised and regulated through the extensive use of licensing giving the State comprehensive control over the direction and pattern of investment. Entry of firms, capacity expansion, choice of product and capacity mix and technology, were all effectively controlled by the State in a bid to prevent the concentration of economic power.
However due to lapses in the system, fresh policies were brought in at the end of the sixties.
These consisted of MRTP of 1969 and FERA of 1973, which were aimed at regulating monopoly and foreign investment respectively. Firms that came under the purview of these Acts were allowed to invest only in a select set of industries.
This net of controls on the economy in the seventies caused several firms to a) operate below the minimum scale of efficiency (henceforth MES), b) under-utilize capacity and, c) use outdated technology. While operation below MES resulted from the fact that several incentives were given to smaller firms, the capacity under-utilization was the result of i) the capacity mix being determined independent of the market demand, ii) the policy of distributing imports based on capacity, causing firms to expand beyond levels determined by demand so as to be eligible for more imports. Use of outdated technology resulted from the restrictions placed on import of technology through the provisions of FERA.
Recognition of the deleterious effects of these policies led to the initiation of reforms in 1975 which took on a more pronounced shape and acquired wider scope under the New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1985. As part of these reforms, several groups of industries were delicensed and 'broadbanding' 5 was permitted in select industries. Controls over capacity expansion were relaxed through the specification of the MES 6 of production for several industries. Foreign investment was allowed in select industries and norms under the MRTP Act were relaxed.
These reforms led to a rise in the trend rate of growth of real GDP from 3.7% in the seventies to 5.4% in the eighties. However the major set of reforms came in 1991 in response A description of the evolution of the two wheeler industry in India is usefully split up into four ten year periods. This division traces significant changes in economic policy making.
The first time-period, 1960-1969 , was one during which the growth of the two-wheeler industry was fostered through means like permitting foreign collaborations and phasing out of 7 The Indian economy was faced with several problems at this time. Foreign exchange reserves were down to two month's imports, there was a large budget deficit, double digit inflation, and with India's credit rating downgraded, private foreign lending was cut off. Also the Gulf war in 1990 brought about an increase in oil prices, and India had to import oil for over US$ 2 billion (GATT Secretariat, 1993) .
non-manufacturing firms in the industry. The period 1970-1980 saw state controls, through the use of the licensing system and certain regulatory acts over the economy, at their peak.
During 1981-1990 significant reforms were initiated in the country. The final time-period covers the period 1991-1999 during which the reform process was deepened These reforms encompassed several areas like finance, trade, tax, industrial policy etc. We now discuss in somewhat greater detail the principal characteristics of each sub period.
a) 1960 -1969
The automobile industry being classified as one of importance under the Industrial Policy
Resolution of 1948 was therefore controlled and regulated by the Government. In order to encourage manufacturing, besides restricting import of complete vehicles, automobile assembler firms were phased out by 1952 (Tariff Commission, 1968) , and only manufacturing firms allowed to continue. Production of automobiles was licensed, which meant that a firm required a licensing approval in order to open a plant. It also meant that a firm's capacity of production was determined by the Government. During this period, collaborations with foreign firms were encouraged. Table 1 illustrates the fact that most firms existing in this period had some form of collaboration with foreign firms. Table 1 also gives the details of the various firms that existed in the industry during this time period and the product/s they manufactured. Table 1 here.
b) 1970 -1980
This was a period during which the overall growth rate of the two-wheeler industry was high (around 15% per annum). Furthermore, the levels of restriction and control over the industry were also high. The former was the result of the steep oil price hikes in 1974 following which two-wheelers became popular modes of personal transport because they offered higher fuelefficiency over cars/jeeps 8 . On the other hand, the introduction of regulatory polices such as MRTP and FERA resulted in a controlled industry. The impact of MRTP was limited as it affected only large firms like Bajaj Auto Ltd. whose growth rates were curbed as they came under the purview of this Act. However, FERA had a more far-reaching effect as it caused foreign investment in India to be restricted. In the motorcycle segment FERA caused technological stagnation 9 , as a consequence of which, neither new products nor firms entered the market since this segment depended almost entirely on foreign collaborations for technology. The scooter and moped segments on the other hand were technologically more self-sufficient and thus there were two new entrants in the scooter segment and three in the moped segment.
c) 1981 -1990
The technological backwardness of the Indian two-wheeler industry was one of the reasons for the initiation of reforms in 1981. Foreign collaborations were allowed for all two-wheelers up to an engine capacity of 100 cc. This prompted a spate of new entries into the industry (Table 1 ) the majority of which entered the motorcycle segment, bringing with them new technology that resulted in more efficient production processes and products 10 . The variety in products available also improved after 'broadbanding' was allowed in the industry in 1985 as 8 Between 1974-79, sales of two-wheelers increased by 60%, while that of cars declined by 21% and jeeps grew only by 11%. 9 Indian motorcycles in the seventies had two major drawbacks viz., low fuel-efficiency and high weight. Worldwide however, there was a trend towards using high-strength, low-weight materials for various components which resulted in vehicles that were compact and had lower weight. Since fuel-consumption of a two-wheeler depended on its weight, lighter vehicles meant greater mileage. These drawbacks were overcome in the eighties when foreign collaborations were once again allowed (see footnote 10).
a part of NEP. This, coupled with the announcement of the MES of production for the twowheeler industry 11 , gave firms the flexibility to choose an optimal product and capacity mix which could better incorporate market demand into their production strategy and thereby improve their capacity utilization and efficiency.
These reforms had two major effects on the industry: First, licensed capacities went up to 1.1 million units per annum overshooting the 0.675 million units per annum target set in the Sixth Plan. Second, several existing but weaker players died out giving way to new entrants and superior products 12 (table 1) .
d) 1991 -1999
The reforms that began in the late seventies underwent their most significant change in 1991 through the liberalization of the economy 13 . The two-wheeler industry was completely deregulated. In the area of trade, several reforms were introduced with the goal of making Indian exports competitive 14 .
The two-wheeler industry in the nineties was characterized by a) an increase in the number of brands available in the market which caused firms to compete on the basis of product features 15 and b) increase in sales volumes in the motorcycle segment vis-à-vis the scooter segment 16 reversing the traditional trend 17 .
III. Data and Methodology
The data for this study was obtained from Infopoint, Center for Monitoring Indian Economy.
Monthly sales volume data for various brands of two-wheelers in the three segments in different Indian states, between the time-period 1988-1998, was used. This ten year time period was chosen as it spanned all major structural shifts that had taken place in the Indian economy in the recent past and would thus enable the study of the effects of liberalization in 1991, on the two-wheeler industry. Data was available for selected brands only.
In order to identify the modeling approach we first tested the sales data for unit roots using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Philips-Perron tests. No unit roots were present indicating that methods applicable to stationary time series would be appropriate. We then attempted to identify the oligopolistic tendency in the two-wheeler industry by calculating the annual Herfindahl Index for firms. We also checked for the existence of certain forces of competition that were not conducive to optimal price setting during this period. We then examine whether the positions of dominance and less dominance in a 15 Firms in the industry introduced products that had almost the same product design but varied in features offered. For instance both Bajaj Auto Ltd. and Kinetic Motors Ltd. introduced scooterettes (a hybrid between a scooter and a moped) in 1998 and 1999. The model offered by the former firm had a two-speed transmission system which was its distinguishing feature, while the separate oil and fuel tank was the unique feature offered by Kinetic. In the motorcycle segment, while Hero Honda models offered fuel-efficiency, Yamaha models offered better output power. In the scooter segment, the four-stroke feature was introduced in the nineties (traditionally scooters were always two-stroke) which was a distinguishing feature since it fulfilled the year 2000 emission norms. 16 Industry sales figures show that scooter sales in 1990 formed 52% of the total two-wheeler sales that year, while the corresponding figures for the motorcycle and moped segments were 26% and 22%. By 1997, these figures had changed to 43%, 36% and 21% respectively (ACMA, various issues). 17 The increasing usage of motorcycles over scooters resulted from a) superior attributes such as increased mileage, greater stability (due to larger wheel-base), maneuverability etc. available in motorcycles, that have resulted from, b) significant improvement in product design of motorcycles, while scooters essentially had the same basic design for the last forty years. This test is conducted both at the industry-wide and segment-specific levels.
One of the methods to examine the presence of non-competitive forces within the industry is through the construction of the Herfindahl Index and concentration ratios. These have historically been used in the U.S. to formulate antitrust laws aimed at regulating competition. The Herfindahl Index is calculated as follows
Where, n is the number of brands, i x is the volume of brand i .
The Herfindahl Index was calculated at the level of the individual segments and for the industry as a whole at each time point in the sample. Table 2 shows the Herfindahl Index for specific time periods and the corresponding four-firm concentration ratios. Table 2 here.
In order to examine whether changes in competitive forces through liberalization have led to some form of stability in the prices in TWI relative to the general level of prices, we compared indices of price calculated for individual segments and for the industry, with that of wholesale price index for manufactured goods. The index was calculated using 1988 as base.
The results are shown in figure 1.
Figure 1 here.
To track the mobility of firms within a segment and to discover whether the positions of firms change over time we compute Kendall's Index of Rank Concordance (see Boyle and McCarthy (1997) , and Jha et. al. (1999) ). Changes in positions of firms will indicate a change in the competitive structure of the industry. For example, if larger firms face diminishing returns due to competitive forces they would stop being market leaders. On the other hand, stability in ranks would imply that certain firms continue to exercise excessive influence in the market.
The methodology of Kendall's Index of Concordance is as follows. where mean(R j ) is the mean of R j , k is the number of years and J the number of brands/markets ranked. Now, ( ) ( )
is the maximum possible sum of squared deviations, i.e., the sum of s which would occur with perfect agreement among k rankings. The value of the rank concordance index varies between zero and one. The coefficient of concordance is calculated for the first two sets of rankings (i.e., the first two years), then for the first three years and so on until for all the years. This enables us to study the mobility of rankings across time. The probability associated with the occurrence under H 0 (rankings are unrelated to each other) of any value as large as an observed W can be determined by finding χ 2 by the formula:
with degrees of freedom J-1. The results are presented in Tables 3 -5 .
Tables 3 to 5 here.
Kendall's Index of Concordance will indicate how the gap between the leader and follower firms in a segment moves over time. Given that the results could indicate a widening gap which would imply an increasing dissimilarity between firms, it would be necessary to examine whether the growth rates of these firms in the long-run tend to become similar (i.e., whether they converge to an equilibrium mean in the long-run).
In order to obtain better characterization of the evolution of the competitive structure of this industry we carried out tests of convergence in levels. Convergence tests for levels have had a chequered history and have, as Boyle and McCarthy (1997) to an appropriately chosen critical value from the ( )
and n ρ are the estimators of n δ and n ρ obtained by applying ordinary least squares to equation 5, n x is a 1 × K vector of variables describing brand n , ν is a parameter, η is a 1 × K parameter vector, and n w is an error term. The results are shown in table 6. Table 6 here.
IV. Results
In a consumer durables industry in which there is a proliferation of brands we expect the longrun competitive structure at the level of the industry to be oligopolistic. This is due to the fact that in order to survive firms must introduce new brands which might improve capacity utilization even as this induces brand competition. This, in turn, will cause only a few large firms in the industry to survive indicating that in the long-run, a brand proliferated consumer durable industry will tend towards oligopoly. We expect a general downward stickiness in prices and resultant increase of volatility in non-price variables such as sales volumes, market-shares etc. Convergence is likely to be absolute at the level of the segment and conditional at the level of the industry. Competitive strategies (which include productdevelopment and other strategies aimed at innovation and technological change) are more inter-dependent at the level of the market-segment than at the level of the industry. This is due to the fact that within each segment the products are, to a large extent, similar. Hence we can expect convergence to be absolute at the level of the segment and conditional at the level of the industry 18 .
The principal results of this study are as follows.
1. The Herfindahl Index was calculated over a period of 10 years, for both the two-wheeler industry as a whole, and for each of the segments. Besanko et al., (1996) state that if the Herfindahl Index is between 0.2 to 0.7, the market will be oligopolistic. If the index is 0.1 or lower, then the market is tending toward monopolistic or perfect competition. In this paper it is found that on an average the index has varied between 0.20 and 0.25 for the two-wheeler industry (Table 2 ). This implies that this industry has evolved into an oligopolistic industry where, product differentiation is a decisive variable. At the level of the individual segments, the oligopolistic forces are more pronounced both in the pre-reform and post-reform periods with the index varying on an average between 0.3 and 0.8. Four firm concentration ratios were also calculated at the level of the industry and individual segments (Figure 1 ). It is seen that while the concentration ratio for the industry is lower than that for the individual segments, the ratios are always higher than 60% at both levels. This indicates the existence of an oligopolistic structure at the segment and industry levels 19 .
2. From Kendall's Rank Concordance test it is seen that the null hypothesis of no agreement between ranks is rejected throughout the period of study. This indicates that over time (including periods of increased competition say in the post-liberalization period), the positions of firms have not changed significantly relative to each other implying that the dominant firm has remained dominant, while the less dominant firms have retained their respective positions relative to the dominant firm. It is also seen that while respective positions are maintained, the gap between the dominant and less-dominant firms is increasing with time. This is true at the segment and industry levels.
3. The Evans and Karras test of Convergence shows that for the industry as a whole, firms will tend to grow at a single equilibrium rate of growth in the long-run, i.e., the likelihood of any firm within the industry or within a product segment, growing at a rate that is consistently faster than others is low in the long-run.
4.
When each of the three segments is analyzed separately, it is found that in the scooter segment there is absolute convergence for both pre reform (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) and post reform (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) periods. The motorcycle segment yields similar results. But in the moped segment, convergence is absolute in the pre-reform period and conditional in the post-reform period. At the industry-wide level convergence is found to be conditional 20 .
V. Conclusions
The computed Herfindahl Index indicate that the Indian two-wheeler industry continues to be oligopolistic in the post-reforms period 21 even though the degree of concentration has declined. This implies that the deregulation of the industry has not led to substantially higher competition. This may reflect the inadequacy of regulatory policy and/or the nature of the technology of the industry wherein an oligopolistic structure is natural. 20 We conducted tests of cointegration on price indices constructed for the various segments. The results reveal that the various segments are not cointegrated implying that markets are segmented at the industry-wide level. However we obtained a cointegrating relationship between the segments and the wholesale price index for manufactured goods. The former reinforces the fact that convergence at the level of the industry is likely to be conditional rather than absolute. From the latter result, one is able to see that individual segments can be affected by movements of the wholesale prices. 21 The Evans test was conducted for capacities of firms in the two-wheeler industry. It was found that the growth rates of capacities of firms do not converge to an equilibrium value in the long run. This implies that small firms in the industry remain small as they do not make sufficient profits to plough back for purposes of capacity expansion. Therefore these firms do not have any effect on the larger firms in terms of causing diminishing returns/fall in profits in the latter. Consequently, larger firms also do not increase capacity. This accounts for the Herfindahl Index remaining at around 0.20-0.25 for the two-wheeler industry over the years.
The values of the Herfindahl Index also indicate that the three segments of the industry have responded in different ways to changes in the forces of competition. This is an outcome of liberalization which led to an unequal number of entrants in each segment. We find that the motorcycle segment has had a greater number of entries than did the scooter or moped segments.
Thus, it is quite possible that when competition-inducing policies are introduced, there could be an unequal number of entrants in each segment, which would then further increase oligopoly in some segments and for the industry as a whole. Oligopoly could also result from the fact that it is existing firms that are introducing new brands rather than new firms entering the industry. When the movement of prices in the three segments is considered, it is seen that prices (net of inflation) have not decreased though the number of brands has increased. This is indicative of oligopoly. Therefore, future reforms in the industrial policy covering the twowheeler industry will probably need to incorporate some mechanism to induce new firms to enter the industry.
The results for Kendall's Rank Concordance Test suggest that a few of the firms in the industry exercise undue influence in the market. This is due to the structure of competition in the market which has led larger firms to succeed in consolidating capacities while smaller firms have remained less-dominant. The Kendall's test also enables us to identify the firms that have contributed to the high levels of concentration in the industry in addition to tracing the mobility of firms in the industry as a whole. This result should come in handy in the formulation of policies on competition which contains appropriate antitrust mechanisms.
Conventional wisdom will lead us to believe that proliferation of brands is a sign of competition. We however find that one of the measurable indices of competition, viz.; the extent of price flexibility is non existent. Non price competition is the norm. This is the outcome of broad banding. Declining firms have taken advantage of this provision and introduced more brands that are for the most part similar. This has lead to highly fractured markets and persistent oligopolistic tendencies.
From the results of the Evans and Karras convergence test and, from the definition of absolute convergence it can be inferred that in the scooter and motorcycle segments, interbrand transmittal of information through promotion, product development, pricing etc. is likely to be effective in influencing the growth rates of other firms in these segments. The firms in the moped segment on other hand, probably compare themselves with firms in another segment (such as scooters) or with other modes of transport 22 and are therefore not inter-dependent. This would explain why convergence is conditional in this segment. 22 Firstly, the scooterette which was first introduced in 1991 in this segment was a hybrid between a scooter and a moped. The scooterette offered more engine power than a moped, and was more fuel-efficient, cheaper and easier to ride (gear-less) than a scooter. The scooterette was therefore an upgradation of the moped and possibly a step-through between mopeds and scooters. Secondly, mopeds being at the lower end of the spectrum of twowheelers are also aimed at consumers using non-motorized modes of personal transport like bicycles. Therefore firms in this segment are likely to perceive themselves as competing with the scooter segment (in the former case) and other modes of transport (in the latter case). 
